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In complex environments, there are costs to both ignorance and perception. An organism needs
to track fitness-relevant information about its world, but the more information it tracks, the more
resources it must devote to memory and processing. Rate-distortion theory shows that, when
errors are allowed, remarkably efficient internal representations can be found by biologically-plausible
hill-climbing mechanisms. We identify two regimes: a high-fidelity regime where perceptual costs
scale logarithmically with environmental complexity, and a low-fidelity regime where perceptual
costs are, remarkably, independent of the environment. When environmental complexity is rising,
Darwinian evolution should drive organisms to the threshold between the high- and low-fidelity
regimes. Organisms that code efficiently will find themselves able to make, just barely, the most
subtle distinctions in their environment.
To survive, organisms must extract useful information
from the environment. This is true over an individual’s
lifetime, when neural spikes [1], signaling molecules [2, 3],
or epigenetic markers [4] encode transient features, as
well as at the population level and over generational
timescales, where the genome can be understood as
hard-wiring facts about the environments under which
it evolved [5]. Processing infrastructure may be built dy-
namically in response to environmental complexity [6–9],
but organisms cannot retain all potentially useful infor-
mation because the real world is too complicated. In-
stead, they can reduce resource demands by tracking a
smaller number of features [10–14].
When they do this, evolved organisms are expected
to structure their perceptual systems to avoid dangerous
confusions (not mistaking tigers for bushes) while strate-
gically containing processing costs by allowing for ambi-
guity (using a single representation for both tigers and
lions)—a form of lossy compression that avoids storing
unnecessary and less-useful information.
We use the informal language of mammalian percep-
tion for our examples here, but similar concerns apply to,
for example, a cellular signaling system which might need
to distinguish temperature signals from signs of low pH,
while tolerating confusion of high temperature with low
oxygenation. We include memory of both low-level per-
cepts and the higher-level concepts they create and that
play a role in decision-making [15–17]. Memory costs in-
clude error-correction and circuit redundancy necessary
to process and transmit in noisy systems [18].
In order to quantify this tradeoff, we must first charac-
terize the costs of confusion. We do so using a distortion
measure, d(x, x˜), that represents the cost to the organism
of mistaking one environmental state, x, for a different
state, x˜. When d(x, x˜) is large, mistaking state x for state
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x˜ is costly. This distortion measure need not be symmet-
ric (it is more costly to mistake a tiger for a bush than
to mistake a bush for a tiger) and not all off-diagonal el-
ements need be large (it is not necessarily more costly to
mistake a tiger for a lion). We assume that d(x, x) is zero
for every state x—that with a well-chosen action policy,
we can do no better perceptually than to faithfully record
our environment.
A great deal of effort has gone into choosing good dis-
tortion measures [14, 19–21]. It turns out that we can
make surprisingly specific predictions about how the or-
ganism’s memory scales with environmental complexity
under mild assumptions about the substrate for mem-
ory storage, the distortion function and (implicitly) the
organism’s action policy, and the structure of the envi-
ronment’s pasts.
For any environment, there is a the minimal cost to
misperceiving an environmental signal, dmin, equal to
minx 6=x˜ d(x, x˜); pairs x and x˜ that satisfy this bound
are called “minimal confounds”. When an organism at-
tempts to achieve average distortion below this minimal
level, we shall see that a critical transition occurs in how
processing costs scale with complexity. This happens
when dmin is independent of the size of the environment.
The dmin threshold separates out a low- and high-fidelity
regime.
In a low-fidelity regime, when an organism’s average
distortion is larger than dmin, increasing environmental
complexity does not increase perceptual load. As the
number of environmental states increases, innocuous syn-
onyms accumulate. They do so sufficiently fast that an
organism can continue to represent the fitness-relevant
features within constant memory.
It is only in a high-fidelity regime, when an organ-
ism attempts to achieve average distortions below dmin,
that memory load becomes sensitive to complexity. High-
fidelity representations of the world do not scale; an or-
ganism that attempts to break this threshold will find
that, when the number of environmental states increases,
its own perceptual apparatus must also increase in size.
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2As we shall see, the existence of this threshold has im-
portant implications for the evolution of perception.
I. RATE DISTORTION THEORY
We quantify the tradeoff between memory storage and
perceptual distortion using rate-distortion theory [22,
Ch. 8]. Rate-distortion allows us to determine the ex-
tent to which the representations needed to completely
describe a source (here, the organism’s environment) can
be compressed by selectively discarding information.
This is lossy compression, in the sense that once the
signal is encoded it becomes impossible to completely re-
construct the original. The process is represented by a
codebook, p(r|x), which describes the probability that an
environmental state x (drawn from the set X) is repre-
sented by a symbol r (drawn from the set R).
Careful choice of p(r|x) allows for the organism to con-
serve resources that would otherwise be committed to the
retention of information. Information theory provides a
mechanism-independent lower bound on these costs. In
particular, the (effective) number of states stored by an
organism’s codebook, per input from the environment,
is lower-bounded by 2I[R;X]. Here, mutual information
quantifies the drop in uncertainty about the environment
given the perceptual state,
I[R;X] = H[X]−H[X|R], (1)
where H[X] is the entropy (uncertainty) of the envi-
ronment, and H[X|R] is the conditional entropy, given
knowledge of the perceptual state r. I[R;X] quantifies
the cost of memory for this lossy representation. It pro-
vides a strict lower bound to the costs of retention and
storage, independent of mechanism.
While biological systems are unlikely to precisely sat-
urate this bound, evidence from a variety of sources
shows that the pressure to store information as efficiently
as possible, given fitness constraints, strongly influences
evolved design, including the genetic code for amino
acids [23] and neural representations of visual scenes [24].
Simple arguments show that, for neural codes, I[R;X] is
an achievable lower bound on the number of neurons re-
quired to encode the environment at (an action-policy
dependent) average distortion D (see Supplementary In-
formation).
To quantify over a variety of possible environments, we
consider cases where the off-diagonal entries of d(x, x˜)
are drawn from a distribution. Doing so allows us to
study complicated environments with many degrees of
freedom, and in which some mistakes are more costly
than others. We begin with the case where d(x, x˜) entries
are drawn independently; however, as we shall show, our
bounds generalize beyond this and include environments
with correlated penalties.
Our problem is then that of finding an optimal code-
book given an upper bound on average costs. We wish
to build the most efficient perceptual system possible as
long as, on average, the cost to the organism of errors
induced by that codebook does not exceed some critical
value, D. We can combine these two demands into a
single minimization problem, where we find the minimal
storage cost, R(D), given the fitness constraint,
R(D) = min
p(r|x) given E[d]≤D
I[R;X], (2)
where E[d] is the average value of d(x, r) given p(x) (dis-
tribution over environmental states, taken to be uniform)
and the codebook (to be found), p(r|x).
The rate, R(D), in bits, quantifies processing cost;
2R(D) is the average cardinality of the organism’s par-
tition of the environment, which can be considered the
effective number of internal representations, Neff , that
the organism can use. The rate R(D) is the best mea-
sure of processing cost when an organism’s mechanisms
include the ability to efficiently compress incoming sen-
sory information. In our account of how perceptual costs
scale with environmental complexity, we plot R(D) as a
function of the number of environmental states N .
Eq. 2 is related to the information bottleneck method
introduced by Ref. [19]. In that program, the distortion
measure is itself an information theoretic quantity—a
particularly useful choice for engineering and machine-
learning applications [25]. Here, by contrast, we have
introduced environmental structure; it is this external
structure, in the form of d(x, x˜), that dictates the nature
of the representations that the system uses.
Once we allow the average error rate, D, to become
non-zero—i.e., once organisms can trade off perceptual
and memory costs with accuracy—solutions of Eq. 2 pro-
vide a guide to how this tradeoff happens in practice. As
we shall see, depending on accuracy demands, an individ-
ual will find itself in either a low- or high-fidelity regime,
with qualitatively different properties.
II. THE LOW-FIDELITY REGIME
Once accuracy costs can be greater than dmin, we can
achieve dramatically reduced bounds on storage. When
organisms are tolerant to failure, they need only attend
to a fraction of the environment. Furthermore, memory
demands on a fault-tolerant organism increase far more
slowly than the complexity of the environment.
We study this first through simulations; Fig. 1 shows
results for optimal codebooks when error costs are expo-
nentially and log-normally distributed; in both cases dmin
is zero. An environment with hundreds of states can be
compressed down to a few dozen at the cost of only 1%
in overall fitness.
Remarkably, when the organism’s average error toler-
ance is greater than dmin, the slow growth in processing
costs, apparent in the simulations, asymptotes to a con-
stant. The suggestive results of the simulations can be
confirmed by simple analytic argument. For each of the
3FIG. 1. Fault-tolerant organisms can radically simplify
their environment. When an organism can tolerate errors
in perception, large savings in storage are possible. Shown
here is the scaling between environmental complexity, N , and
processing costs R(D), when we constrain the average distor-
tion, D to be 1% and 0.1% of the average cost of random
guessing. We consider both environments with exponential
and with log-normal (heavy-tailed) fitness; in both cases, dmin
is equal to zero. A simple argument (see text) shows that in
this low-fidelity regime, and as N goes to infinity, perceptual
demands asymptote to a constant.
N environmental states, and overall error constraint D,
there will be, on average, NP (d < D) states that are al-
lowable ambiguities—i.e., that the organism can take as
synonyms for that percept. While this is not the most ef-
ficient coding, it provides an upper bound to the optimal
rate R(D).
The rate for such an encoding is approximately logN−
logNP (d < D), which becomes exact in the large N
limit. This means that both the encoding rate, R(D)
and the effective symbol size go to a constant; effective
symbol size proportional to the inverse of the conditional
probability distribution, 1/P (d < D), and R(D) to its
logarithm. More generally, R(D) is bounded from above
so that
R(D) ≤ 1
N
∑
x
log2
(
N
ND(x)
)
, (3)
where ND(x) is the number of synonyms for x with dis-
tortion penalty less than D (see Supplementary Informa-
tion). This fact is independent of the underlying distri-
bution. As long as ND is asymptotically proportional to
N , this upper bound implies asymptotic insensitivity to
the number of states of the environment. This is the case
even when off diagonal entries are partially correlated, as
long as correlation scales grow more slowly than environ-
ment size so that ND ∝ N .
For the exponential this upper bound means that am-
biguities accumulate sufficiently fast that the organism
will need at most 6.6 bits (for D equal to 1%) or 10 bits
(for D equal to 0.1%) even when the set of environmental
states becomes arbitrarily large.
This bound is not tight; as can be seen in Fig. 1, far
better compressions are possible, and the system asymp-
totes at much lower values. When N becomes large, these
compressions are more reliably obtained (i.e., the vari-
ance in compression rate decreases rapidly, so that most
fitness functions one draws can be compressed to a nearly
identical extent). These empirical results show not only
the validity of the bound, but that actual behavior has a
rapid asymptote; in both the exponential and log-normal
cases, the scaling of Neff is already sub-logarithmic in N .
That the bound relies on the conditional distribution
function means that our results are robust to heavy-tailed
distributions. What matters is the existence of harmless
synonyms; for the states we end up being forbidden to
confuse, penalties can be arbitrarily large. We can see
this in Fig. 1, where we consider a log-normal distribution
with mean and variance chosen so that P (d < 0.1%)
is identical to the exponential case. The existence of
large penalties in the log-normal case does not affect the
asymptotic behavior.
This remarkable result has, at first, a counterintuitive
feel. As environmental richness rises, it seems that the or-
ganism should have to track increasing numbers of states.
However, the compression efficiency depends on the dif-
ference between environmental uncertainty before and af-
ter optimal compression, and these two differences, in the
asymptotic limit, scale identically with N .
The existence of asymptotic bounds on memory can
also be understood by an example from software engi-
neering. As the web grows in size, a search tool such as
Google needs to track an increasing number of pages (en-
vironmental complexity rises). If the growth of the web
is uniform, and the tool is well-built, however, the num-
ber of keywords a user needs to put into the search query
does not change over time. For any particular query—
“information theory neuroscience”, say—the results re-
turned will vary, as more and more relevant pages are
created (ambiguity rises), but the user will be similarly
4satisfied with the results (error costs remain low).1
III. THE HIGH-FIDELITY REGIME
As we approach dmin, the bound given by 1/P (d < D)
becomes increasingly weak, diverging when D is at the
minimal confound level. As we approach this threshold,
we enter the high-fidelity regime, where organisms at-
tempt to distinguish difference at a fine-grained level.
In this regime, where we attempt to achieve lower
error-rates than those of the minimal confounds, we
can no longer allow for strict synonyms between a sub-
selection of the off-diagonal elements. Our codebook,
p(r|x), must attempt to break the degeneracy between
the true environmental state and off-diagonal elements;
as the environmental complexity increases, this task,
in explicit contrast to the low-fidelity regime, becomes
harder as the environment becomes richer.
As in the previous case, we can upper-bound coding
costs by construction of a sub-optimal codebook; we can
also lower-bound costs by finding the optimal codebook
for a strictly less-stringent environment. Coding costs are
then bounded between (see Supplementary Information)
(
1− D
dmin
)
log2(N) ≤ R(D) ≤
(
1− D
d¯
)
log2(N), (4)
where d¯ is the average off-diagonal cost in the environ-
ment. These bounds hold in the high-fidelity regime
where D ≤ dmin.
The distributions—exponential and log-normal—
described in the previous section do not have a high-
fidelity regime; as environmental complexity rises, so
does the number of harmless synonyms. If, however, we
put a floor on these distributions, so that there is always
a strictly non-zero penalty for confusion, the scaling of
Eq. 4 appears. Fig. 2 compares these two regimes—the
low-fidelity regime of Eq. 3, and the high-fidelity regime
of Eq. 4—for error costs with d(x, x˜) greater than unity,
and distributed exponentially. In the low-fidelity regime,
D > 1, we see the same asymptotic complexity as in
Fig. 1; when we try to achieve bounds below the minimal
confound, the lower bound of Eq. 4 becomes relevant, and
R(D) scales logarithmically with N (equivalently, Neff is
a power-law in N , with Neff equal to N in the zero error
limit).
The change-over is shown graphically in Fig. 2. While
processing costs for the low-fidelity regime asymptote to
a constant as N becomes large, the lower bound for the
high-fidelity regime provides an asymptotic limit to the
slope of the Neff curve on a log-log plot (equivalently, a
R(D) ∼ logN relationship). This holds true even when
1 We are grateful to Michael Lachmann for suggesting this exam-
ple.
FIG. 2. The high-fidelity regime is sensitive to envi-
ronmental complexity. Shown here are encoding costs for
the shifted exponential distribution, where all errors have a
minimal penalty, dmin, of one. When we allow average dis-
tortions to be greater than dmin, we are in the low-fidelity
regime, and costs, as measured by R(D), become constant. In
the high-fidelity regime, when D is less than dmin, costs con-
tinue to increase, becoming asymptotically power-law in Neff ,
or logarithmic in R(D); the dashed line shows the asymp-
totic (in this case) square-root scaling for D/dmin equal to
1/2. The change-over from constant to this power-law scaling
happens around D ∼ dmin. A simple argument suggests that
evolution under increasing complexity will drive organisms to
this transition point.
environmental costs are correlated; the lower panel of
Fig. 2 shows the same curves where the unconditioned
cost distributions are identical, but we have induced pair-
wise correlations by averaging each row with a shuffled
version of itself (except for the diagonal point, which re-
mains zero).
5IV. EVOLUTION AND POISED PERCEPTION
An organism’s fitness includes both its error rate, D,
and the processing costs associated with achieving that
rate, R(D). Under the simplifying assumption that these
costs add independently, and taking processing costs to
be proportional to R(D), we can take an organism’s fit-
ness, F to be a monotonically decreasing function of to-
tal cost D+β−1R(D), which takes into account the costs
of both error and perceptual processing. The Lagrange
multiplier, β, characterises the error–computation trade-
off. This basic linear tradeoff is a natural choice that
has been the basis of studies of encoding in molecular
biological systems (Ref. [2] and references therein).
Evolutionary processes tend to maximize fitness at
the population level; the fitness of an organism can be
thought of as its reproductive rate relative to average.
Whatever the value of β, a higher than average fitness
will, given sufficiently faithful reproduction, translate
into exponential gains for that organism and its descen-
dants. Rather than considering absolute differences we
can then focus on rank order—what changes cause the
fitness to rise or fall relative to baseline.
For any particular β tradeoff, there will be a unique,
fitness-optimal solution. Because fitness is convex in the
choice of the codebook [19, Thm. 3], finding the opti-
mal point corresponds to an unsupervised classification
of sensory signals based on gradient descent. It is thus
a natural task for an organism’s neural system [26–29],
and also corresponds to the simplest models of selection
in evolutionary time [30].
By finding new and more efficient mechanisms to pro-
cess information, evolution can increase an individual’s
β.2 This enables the individual to make finer and finer
distinctions and thereby both lower D and raise its fit-
ness. In the low-fidelity regime, when organisms com-
pete in this fashion, their gains in accuracy are indepen-
dent of increases in environmental complexity. As they
increase β through evolutionary innovation, individuals
will find an optimal fitness point at lower and lower val-
ues of D. Above the dmin threshold, even large changes
in N will leave the optimal D for any particular β un-
changed. Low-fidelity perceptual systems are robust to
large changes in environmental complexity.
As D approaches, and then goes below, dmin, the pic-
ture changes drastically. Organisms may compete to
lower D, but gains are transitory when the environment
is itself changing. In particular, increases in environmen-
tal complexity mean that R(D) will now rise at least
logarithmically as N increases. For the lower bound, we
2 We assume the timescale on which β changes is much slower
than the timescale for an organism to find the optimal codebook
at fixed β. This is natural when, for example, codebooks are
found in ontogenetic time while improvements in the information
processing substrate must evolve.
have
∂2
∂N∂D
(D + β−1R(D)) ≤ − 1
dminβN
< 0, (5)
so that, when N increases, organisms at the lower bound
can lower costs by going to larger D. (This derivative
relationship holds even when the bound is not tight, but
R(D) takes the form f(D) log2N , with f(D) indepen-
dent of N , since R(D) is a decreasing function of D.
More generally still, as N increases, the growing lower
bound of Eq. 4 means that costs in the high-fidelity
regime will eventually exceed the fixed costs of solutions
around D ∼ dmin.)
Since fitness is a monotonic function of cost, the new
fitness maximum will also lie in the direction of larger D.
As complexity rises, organisms in the high-fidelity regime
will be driven towards dmin, at the threshold between
high and low-fidelity perception. This driving force, to-
wards larger D, also holds when we take the costs to scale
with effective symbol number, Neff , which is exponential
in R(D).
Taken together, these results imply that, when organ-
isms compete in an environment of rising complexity, we
expect to find their perceptual apparatus poised around
D ∼ dmin. We refer to this as poised perception.
Organisms will compete on processing efficiency, in-
creasing β and pushing D downward. This process is
asymptotically insensitive to environmental complexity
until a transition region around dmin. Beyond this point,
rising complexity provides a counter-force. When N is
large and rising on timescales faster than those on which
evolution increases β, we expect organisms to stall out
at this threshold. Even when they are poised around
dmin, increasing β will still give an individual an evolu-
tionary advantage; the effect of a changing environment
is to force organisms to compete on efficiency, rather than
richness of internal representations.
V. DISCUSSION
Where there is an accuracy–memory tradeoff, our re-
sults suggest that organisms in environments of rising
complexity will find themselves able to distinguish mini-
mal confounds, but no more.
We expect this to happen when the number of cate-
gories to be distinguished can rise. It is worth consid-
ering what happens when the environment has a hierar-
chical structure, and where there may be a fixed number
of coarse-grained distinctions that are crucial to main-
tain, such as those between predator and prey, kin and
non-kin, in-group and out-group.
Because of this hierarchical structure we do not ex-
pect organisms to have a single system for represent-
ing their environment. The results here then apply to
subdomains of the perceptual problem. In the case of
predator–prey, for example, we expect optimal codebooks
6will look block-diagonal, with a clear predator–prey dis-
tinction, and then subdistinctions for the two categories
(eagle vs. leopard; inedible vs. edible plants).
For the large distinction, N is fixed, but environmen-
tal complexity can increase within each category. As
new forms of predators or prey arise, the arguments here
suggest that organisms will be poised at the thresholds
within each subsystem. When, for example, prey may
be toxic, predators will evolve to distinguish toxic from
non-toxic prey, but tend not to distinguish between near-
synonyms within either the toxic or non-toxic categories.
Such an effect may influence the evolution of Batesian
mimicry—where a non-toxic prey species imitates a toxic
one—when such mimicry is driven by the perceptual abil-
ities of predators [31]. Our arguments here suggest that
predator perception evolves in such a way that Batesian
mimics will have a phenotypic range similar to that found
between two toxic species. A harmless Batesian mimic
can then emerge if it can approximate, in appearance, a
toxic species by roughly the same amount as that species
resembles a second species, also toxic. This also sug-
gests that a diversity of equally-toxic species will lead
to less-accurate mimicry. This is not because a mimic
will attempt to model different species simultaneously
(the multimodal hypothesis [32]), rather that predators
who attempt to make finer-grained distinctions within
the toxic-species space will find themselves driven back
to dmin when the total number of species increases.
Our results also have implications for the cognitive and
social sciences. A small number of coarse-grained distinc-
tions are often found in human social cognition, where
we expect a block-diagonal structure over a small, fixed
number of categories (kin vs. non-kin, in-group vs. out-
group). Within each of the large distinctions, our rep-
resentational systems are then tasked with making fine-
grained distinctions over sets of varying size.
When we attempt to make distinctions within a sub-
category of increasing size, our results suggest that we
will be barely competent at making the least important
distinctions. Informally, we are just barely able to dis-
tinguish our least-important friends when our circles ex-
pand. Such ideas might be tested in a laboratory-based
study that trains subjects on a set of increasingly dif-
ficult distinction tasks with varying rewards. The re-
sults here predict that, as they improve their decision-
making abilities, individuals will develop representations
that are barely able to make distinctions between the
least-important cases.
Our results on poised perception apply when environ-
ments can increase in complexity over time and when
perceptual systems struggle to represent and process en-
vironmental states. Rate-distortion theory provides new
quantitative insight into the underlying structure of this
problem. While not all perception problems take this
form, those that do are key evolutionary drivers of in-
creased perceptual and cognitive ability.
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7Appendix A: Supplementary Information
In this Appendix, we provide more discussion of the basic rate-distortion set-up and connect it to recent progress in
understanding the sensorimotor loop. We present extended derivations of the results presented in the main text. And
we present results that suggest, in the low-fidelity regime, a distribution-dependent universality in the rate-distortion
curve
We begin with a typical reinforcement learning setup [33]. An agent takes a total of T actions a0, . . . , aT throughout
its life in response to an environment whose state at any given timestep i is xi. The actions that the agent takes are,
we assume, dependent only on the sensory percepts that the agent has stored at timestep i, x˜i. We denote this by
writing ai as ai(x˜i). In principle, these percepts can take into account information about the environment’s past as
well as its current state. The reward that an agent receives upon taking a particular action ai(x˜i) is taken to be a
function of the environment’s present state xi, r(xi, ai(x˜i)). The agent accumulates a total reward of
R =
T∑
i=0
r(xi, ai(x˜i)) (A1)
over its lifetime. In principle, this reward function could depend upon the environment’s past as well as its present
state [21, 34–36]; this additional layer of complexity is unnecessary to make the present point.
Much work in reinforcement learning has focused on choosing optimal action policies. However, good action policies
require accurate or nearly-accurate sensory perceptions. If we mistake a lion for a deer, we will probably die, despite
having an optimal plan in place once we see a deer. We thus limits to our sensory models given finite resource
constraints.
When the joint time series of inputs and actions is stationary, we can move from viewing the environment and
the agent’s actions as time series to viewing them as realizations of a stochastic process characterized by probability
distributions Pr(X = x, X˜ = x˜, A = a). This probability distribution implicitly allows for random action policies; a
deterministic action policy would imply that Pr(A = a|X˜ = x˜) = δa,a(x˜). The assumption from earlier that the action
policy depends on the environment only through the sensory percept is more compactly described as X → X˜ → A
when we view the environmental state, the agent’s sensory percept, and the agent’s actions as random variables. And
finally, the total reward is now expressible as
R ≈ T
∑
x,x˜,a
Pr(X = x, X˜ = x˜, A = a)r(x, a(x˜)), (A2)
so we find it convenient to define an expected reward of E[r] = RT ≈
∑
x,x˜,a Pr(X = x, X˜ = x˜, A = a)r(x, a(x˜)).
Many real-world situations ask us to model environments which are prohibitively large, and recording the present
environmental state with perfect fidelity is unreasonable given finite memory, energy, and other resource constraints.
These constraints are thought to be relevant to how organisms actually function, e.g., as in Refs. [37–40], though
the particular way in which these resource constraints affect organism computation might depend strongly on the
organism’s specific memory substrate. For example, E. coli bacteria, which store information about concentration
gradients in the stochastic behavior of their ligand-gated ion channels, will have different energy, timing, and space
costs than a human who stores information about more complex environments in everything from the structure of
dendritic trees to the higher-level structure of cortical columns and all the way up to the maintenance of external
records made possible by symbolic systems and writing.
Despite this, rate-distortion theory provides insight into the tradeoff between the quality of an agent’s perception of
the environment and the memory required to store those perceptions, regardless of the particular biological substrate
for that memory. In economics, this realization goes under the name of “rational inattention” [14]; in theoretical
neuroscience, this idea has taken hold in a few recent papers [41, 42], though more attention has been focused on
the lossless limit [43]. These ideas are related to, but distinct from, Bayesian inference. We focus only on the
memory limitations related to storing sensory information and not those related to taking action; see Refs. [21, 34]
and references therein for efforts on the latter.
To make these general ideas concrete, we focus on an agent with n neurons which communicate sensory information
to higher cortical levels by their collective state at each time step. There are a total of 2n possible states of these n
neurons, implying a maximal rate of log2 2
n = n bits per input symbol. For more direct connection with the language
of rate-distortion theory, we think about our actions not as opportunities to reap rewards, but as potentially lost
opportunities to reap higher rewards. If we fail to faithfully record an environmental state x with the sensory percept
x˜, then our actions will necessarily fall short of the optimal actions. For each environmental state x and action policy
Pr(A|X˜), there is some maximum reward r∗(x) achieved by faithfully recording x in our sensory percept with an
8expected maximal reward of
E[r∗] =
∑
x
Pr(X = x)r∗(x). (A3)
The rate-distortion theorem implies that
min
Pr(X˜|X):E[r∗]−E[r]≤D
I[R;X] = R(D) ≤ n, (A4)
or, in words, that the implicitly action policy dependent rate-distortion function is a lower bound on the number of
sensory neurons. For details, see Refs. [22] or other standard information theory texts. This bound may or may not
be tight, though there is preliminary evidence that the bound is surprisingly tight [41, 42]. We emphasize that this
example was used to illustrate an even more general point. In other setups, this rate-distortion function may be a
lower bound on the number of hidden states in an ion channel, for instance.
The questions that we ask in this manuscript do not require that this bound be tight; rather, we aim to ask how
R(D) scales with the number of environmental states N , and hope that the scaling relations provided are tight even
if the specific bound is not. A key quantity, dmin, is the minimal price we pay for not faithfully transmitting the
environmental state:
dmin := min
x,x˜ 6=x
r∗(x)− r(x, a(x˜)), (A5)
and pairs that satisfy this bound are called “minimal confounds”. Despite the generality of this setup, there are
apparently two different regimes for how R(D) scales with N . When D ≤ dmin, then R(D) scales logarithmically
with N ; when D > dmin, then R(D) asymptotes to a constant as N tends to infinity. (This somewhat surprising
result might be anticipated by an earlier theorem [44] showing that the optimal lossy representations of continuous
random variables are discrete.) Additional structure in the environment would likely contribute to delineation of
further scaling regimes, which we do not pursue here.
If we assume that we should choose the minimal D such that we have some robustness to sudden increases in
environmental complexity—i.e., such that R(D) does not increase greatly with N—then our results suggest that D
is optimally set to be dmin.
1. An example: random environments
To obtain some intuition, we consider the case that distortions are chosen i.i.d. from a distribution with probability
density function φ. (From our earlier construction, on-diagonal entries are set to d(x, x) = 0.)
See Fig. 1 in the main text, giving R(D) for several D for various distributions φ and N . These numerical
experiments suggest a weak universality in rate-distortion functions, apparent from the increasingly small variance in
R(D) for different random distortion matrices: as N →∞, R(D) is a statistic of φ and is independent of the specific
distortion measure. If true, this conjecture implies that the required resources might be time-invariant even if the
reward function is not.
We now ask how φ affects the scaling of R(D) with N . When we mean-shift φ by dmin, R(D) starts to show
deviations from the weak universality just described. Two different random distortion measures with the same φ and
N still produce nearly identical R(D). But for expected distortions D < dmin, R(D) appears to grow logarithmically
with N , while for expected distortions D ≥ dmin, R(D) tends to a constant, independent of N . This is shown in
Fig. 4.
2. Scaling of n with N depends on desired reward
We can use analytic upper and lower bounds to explain some of the results found above. Define the minimal
distortion
dmin := min
x 6=x˜
d(x, x˜) (A6)
9FIG. 3. Rate-distortion functions for φ(x) = e−x for increasing N . First five plots: rate-distortion functions for five
different samples of the distortion measure; from left to right, we show N of 20, 50, 100, 200 and 300. Rate-distortion functions
for different draws from the d(x, x˜) ensemble are nearly identical as N gets large. Bottom right plot: the means of the
rate-distortion functions over the ensemble of matrices for various N . As N increases, these appear to limit to a rate-distortion
function which is everywhere bounded.
and the average distortion
d¯ :=
1
N(N − 1)
∑
x 6=x˜
d(x, x˜). (A7)
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FIG. 4. Rate-distortion functions for φ(x) = 1 + e−x for increasing N . First five plots: rate-distortion functions
for five different samples of the distortion measure; from left to right, we show N of 20, 50, 100, 200 and 300. At N ≥ 100,
rate-distortion functions for different draws from the ensemble are nearly identical. Bottom right plot: the means of the
rate-distortion functions over the ensemble of matrices for various N . As N increases, the behavior is distinct from that in
Fig. 3 and R(D) curves for increasing N do not asymptote to a single distribution; for D ≤ 1, analytic bounds find that R(D)
will increase without bound as N increases; spacing between lines should scale logarithmically (Eq. 4, main text).
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The former is the distortion in the best-possible miscoding. The latter is the expected distortion when we choose our
actions independently of the environment. Also, assume that inputs are equiprobable, p(x) = 1N for all x.
First, we upper bound the rate-distortion function in the high-fidelity regime using the suboptimal codebook
p(x˜|x) =
{
1− C x˜ = x
C
N−1 x˜ 6= x
(A8)
for 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. Symmetry implies that p(x˜) = 1N for all x˜. This codebook has an expected distortion of
〈d〉 =
∑
x,x˜
p(x)p(x˜|x)d(x, x˜) = C
N(N − 1)
∑
x 6=x˜
d(x, x˜) = Cd¯, (A9)
and a rate of
I[X; X˜] = H[X˜]−H[X˜|X] = log2N −
1
N
∑
x
H[X˜|X = x] (A10)
where application of the additivity axiom shows
H[X˜|X = x] = Hb[C] + C log2(N − 1). (A11)
Together, this gives
I[X; X˜] = log2N −Hb[C]− C log2(N − 1) = log2N −Hb
[ 〈d〉
d¯
]
− 〈d〉
d¯
log2(N − 1). (A12)
Hence, when D ≤ d¯, the rate-distortion function is upper-bounded by
R(D) ≤ log2N −Hb
[
D
d¯
]
− D
d¯
log2(N − 1) ≈
(
1− D
d¯
)
log2N. (A13)
Next, we lower-bound the rate-distortion function by lower-bounding the distortion-rate function,
D(R) := min
p(x˜|x):I[X;X˜]≤R
〈d〉. (A14)
This is (by construction) greater than or equal to the distortion-rate function for the distortion measure,
dL(x, x˜) =
{
0 x = x˜
dmin x 6= x˜ . (A15)
By symmetry, the optimal codebook for this distortion measure takes the form of the suboptimal codebooks above.
(It is straightforward to check that those suboptimal codebooks satisfy the nonlinear equations in Thm. 3 of Ref.
[19].) Hence, the rate-distortion function is lower-bounded:
log2N −Hb
[
D
dmin
]
− D
dmin
log2(N − 1) ≤ R(D), (A16)
valid when D ≤ dmin. Together, the two bounds imply
log2N −Hb
[
D
dmin
]
− D
dmin
log2(N − 1) ≤ R(D) ≤ log2N −Hb
[
D
d¯
]
− D
d¯
log2(N − 1) (A17)
when D ≤ dmin. In the large N limit, we find that(
1− D
dmin
)
log2N ≤ R(D) ≤
(
1− D
d¯
)
log2N. (A18)
So, the rate-distortion function and the required number of neurons scale logarithmically with the number of inputs
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in the high-fidelity regime.
3. Low-fidelity regime
Now we find an upper bound on the rate-distortion function in the regime that D ≥ dmin. Consider a suboptimal
codebook of the form
p(x˜|x) =
{
1
ND(x)
d(x, x˜) ≤ D
0 d(x, x˜) > D
(A19)
where
ND(x) :=
∑
x˜
δd(x,x˜)≤D. (A20)
By construction, this codebook has an expected distortion ≤ D. Its rate is
I[X; X˜] = H[X˜]−H[X˜|X] = H[X˜]− 1
N
∑
x
log2ND(x). (A21)
In general, p(x˜) could be rather complicated, but we can always upper bound H[X˜] ≤ log2N , giving
I[X; X˜] ≤ log2N −
1
N
∑
x
log2ND(x) =
1
N
∑
x
log2
N
ND(x)
. (A22)
As long as ND(x) scales linearly with N and not sublinearly, then the rate of this codebook is independent of N in
the large N limit. Hence we find an upper bound
R(D) ≤ 1
N
∑
x
log2
N
ND(x)
. (A23)
For many distortion measures—those for which ND(x) ∝ N—this upper bound will imply that R(D) is O(1) in N .
For instance, if distortions are chosen randomly (as we discussed earlier), then
lim
N→∞
N
ND(x)
=
1
Pr(d(x, x˜) ≤ D) (A24)
and
R(D) ≤ log2
1
Pr(d(x, x˜) ≤ D) . (A25)
The upper bound relies only on a single feature of the probability distribution, not on N .
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